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Abstract 
We find that fiscal austerity is associated with a reduction of human development standards, with 
the negative effect being particularly severe in the case of spending-driven consolidation episodes. 
Fiscal adjustments are especially damaging for human development in developing countries 
(namely, African and Latin American countries). Additionally, the empirical evidence shows that: 
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investment in physical capital can boost human development, government consumption and 
inflation are detrimentalto it. 
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"We sinned against the dignity of the people in Greece, Portugal and sometimes Ireland." 
- Jean Claude Juncker, 19 February 2015 
 
1. Introduction 
The investigation of the determinants of the level of income per capita or economic growth 
has been at the cornerstone of a large body of the theoretical and empirical literature(Blinder and 
Giorgiadis, 2010).  
In the aftermath of the Great Recession andthe subsequent emergence of the sovereign debt 
crisis, a great deal of attention has shiftedtowards the need to understand the effects of fiscal 
consolidation packages on the income level and its distribution, or to assess the macroeconomic, 
political and institutional drivers of the duration of such fiscal adjustments(Mallick and Mohsin, 
2007, 2010; Rafiq and Mallick, 2008; Agnello et al., 2013; Agnello and Sousa, 2014). 
Despite this, the literature on the topic has neglected the impact of austerity packages on 
other crucial dimensions of the whole set of opportunities that are available to individuals, such as 
education, health and economic development. These can be captured by a broader measure of living 
standards, such as human development (Sen, 1999). 
From a theoretical perspective, fiscal consolidations mayunnecessarily prolong economic 
recessions (IMF, 2013), thus, worseninglabour market conditions and leading to a substantial rise in 
unemployment (Agnello et al., 2014). This has the potential of generating long-lasting effects not 
only on real economic activity, but also on other dimensions of human development, such as 
education and health. For instance, Mallick and Granville (2005) show that fiscal consolidation only 
provides a temporary and unsustainable solution to poverty reduction.According to ILO (2014), 
fiscal consolidation measures have largely reduced the funds available for social programs, 
especially, those directed to the most vulnerable groups of women. Schaltegger and Weder (2014) 
also argue that the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis and the subsequent policy responses 
disproportionately affected the vulnerable population. Armingeon et al. (2014) find that fiscal 
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adjustment programs are typically associated with a retrenchment of public social expenditures 
(such as, government expenditures on education and health services, thus, the welfare state) even 
though this normally requires a broad pro-reform coalition, as austerity measures are electorally and 
politically risky. 
In this context, it is well known that data about national income does not provide 
information about the composition of income or the real beneficiaries. Moreover, economic agents 
frequently value achievements, such as better education and health services, broader participation in 
economic, cultural and political activities of the local community, improvements in working 
conditions and security against crime and physical violence, that are not necessarily reflected in 
higher income or output growth (United Nations, 1990). Thus, it seems sensible to consider other 
dimensions of economic development, instead of merely income or its distribution, on the 
assessment of the effects of fiscal consolidation. 
Against this background, our paper analyses, from an empirical point of view, the impact of 
fiscal austerity on human development. We find that fiscal consolidation episodes are associated 
with a deterioration of human development. Moreover, while human development substantially 
worsens when fiscal consolidation is achieved via spending cuts, it does not seem to be affected by 
tax-driven austerity measures. 
Splitting the sample into sub-groups, our findings suggest that fiscal consolidation does not 
significantly impact human development process in OECD countries, but developing countries 
experience a large decline in human developmentduring periods of austerity.  
When we consider the geographical dimension, we find that, in European countries, human 
development appears to be relatively immune to fiscal consolidation efforts. However, human 
development in Latin American and, especially, African countries is particularly vulnerable and 
strongly hit by fiscal adjustments. 
Additionally, our results show that: (i) among the set of institutional variables that explain 
human development, government stability is particularly important; and (ii) macroeconomic 
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conditions matter and while government consumption and inflation are detrimental for human 
development, investment in physical capital tends to improve it. 
Our work is highly indebted and simultaneously inspired by the research of Binder and 
Georgiadis (2010) and Antonakakis and Collins (2014a, 2014b). Binder and Georgiadis (2010) rely 
on the United Nations' Human Development Index and highlight that macroeconomic policies have 
a stronger impact on human development than economic conditions. In particular, the authors study 
the effects of government consumption, investment in physical and trade openness on human 
development and GDP per capita, while accounting for characteristics such as gender inequality, 
institutional quality and religious environment. They show that a rise in government consumption 
have an expansionary (contractionary) effect in countries with low (high) institutional quality. 
Antonakakis and Collins (2014a, 2014b) focus on data from the WorldHealth Organization (WHO) 
Mortality Databasefor Eurozone peripheral countries (i.e. Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and 
Spain), which recently implemented fiscal consolidation efforts, and document a significant effect 
on suicide mortality.The authors use several proxies of fiscal consolidation (including the general 
government final consumption expenditure as a percentage of GDP, taxes, the budget deficit and a 
dummy variable that identifies fiscal consolidation episodes based on the work of Afonso (2010)) 
and control for both the cyclical nature of suicide mortality and changes in alcohol consumption, 
divorce rates and fertility rates. They conclude that the effects of fiscal austerity measures are age-, 
gender- and time-specific. 
We try to contribute to this literature along various dimensions. First, we pay a special 
attention to the identification of fiscal consolidation episodes and use a statistical approach based on 
the work of Alesina and Ardagna (1998), which focuses on variation in the cyclically adjusted 
primary budget balance (CAPB).Second, we consider different dimensions of the fiscal 
consolidation program (namely, the timing, the duration and the composition) thereby, 
distinguishing between measures that are led by expenditure cuts and those that are driven by tax 
hikes. Third, we cover a large set of countries for which data on human development are available, 
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which allows us to include both countries that have undergone fiscal consolidation programs and 
those that did not experience periods of fiscal adjustment. Finally, we account for changes in a wide 
range of macroeconomic, political, social, risk and geographical drivers of human development. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the related literature. 
Section 3 discusses the econometric methodology. Section 4 describes the data. Section 5 provides 
the empirical results. Finally, Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Literature Review 
The long-run economic development has been at the core of theoretical and empirical 
research for several years.Not surprisingly, a vast number of works have tried to construct measures 
of wellbeing. Indeed, the 1990 Human Development Report and the seminal research by Fukuda-
Parr and Shiva Kumar (2003) have set the stage for much of the subsequent investigation that 
followed.  
According to UlHaq (1995), the Human Development Indicator (hereforth, HDI) index has 
three main features. First, it measures well-being and not just income. Second, it includes both 
economic and social dimensions of human development.Third, its coverage and methodology is 
flexible enough to allow a measure of multi-dimensional wellbeing. Alkire (2007), Comim et al. 
(2008) and Molina and Purser (2010) also point out that the HDI index allows for simple, replicable 
and comparable cross-country and within-country measures of human development. Ranis et al. 
(2005) show that under-five child mortality is highly correlated with – and a good proxy for – the 
HDI index. Wolfers (2009) finds that income per capita is highly correlated with HDI ranking. By 
contrast, Rodriguez (2009) emphasizes that the HDI index is more useful for comparisons of well-
being at a given point in time than for assessing its driving forces over time. Along the same line, 
Srinivasan (1994) argues that the correlation between the set of indicators included in the HDI 
index is high, thus, casting doubts about the relevance of aggregating such information into a single 
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index. Behrman and Rosenzweig (1994) highlight that data for each of the sub-components of the 
HDI index is not always readily available. 
Another strand of the literature has focused on modelling long-run social and economic 
trends, by looking at the dynamics of the GDP growth and life expectancy and health outcomes. In 
this context, the works on the GDP growth suggest that, accounting for initial level of GDP per 
capita, there is cross-country ("conditional") convergence over time (Barro 1991; Barro and Sala-i-
Martin 1992). Quah (1996) claims that the empirical evidence supports the existence of “club 
convergence”, as countries that are structurally different display divergence or weak convergence. 
Using data for India, the UK and the US, Kenny (2005) finds that there is long-term convergence of 
education, health and infrastructure measures. By contrast, Pritchett (1997) and Bourguignon et al. 
(2004) uncover large divergence across countries un-weighted by population, but the latter also find 
income converge when weighting by population. 
As for the research on life expectancy and health outcomes, the majority of works tend for 
focus on child mortality rather than life-expectancy (Deaton, 2003, 2006). Cutler, Deaton and 
Lleras-Muney (2005) show that, despite the increase in life-expectancy over the past 30 years, the 
disparities between the developed and developing world have been unequally distributed. 
Moreover, changes in sanitation and water conditions and low-cost treatments for infectious and 
respiratory diseases are key determinants of the improvement in child mortality, after controlling for 
income. Deaton (2003) investigates the relationship between health outcomes and income, and 
suggests that by affecting various economic and social dimensions, such as education, control, rank 
or wealth, income is not independent of health status. Additionally, Deaton (2006) highlights that 
social factors play an important role at the provision of health services, and Molina and Purser 
(2010) focus on the level of female fertility and the female schooling attainment as explaining 
trends in the child mortality rate.  
Nevertheless, some authors also analyse the relevance of improvements in life-expectancy 
for the dynamics of human development. For instance, Gladstone (2010) emphasizes the rise of the 
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old inactive population rises as a share of the young active population. Bloom and Friedman (1997), 
Bloom and Williamson (1998) and Bloom et al. (2003) also show that the drop in the economic 
dependency ratio has an impact on how human development evolves over time. Bloom et al. (2007) 
specifically highlight the drop in fertility rates and the increase in female labor market participation 
and schooling rates. Timmer and Akkus (2008) assess the gender determinants of long-term human 
development.  
Being a broad measure that captures different economic and social faces and in the light of 
the ongoing debate about the ultimate consequences of fiscal austerity measures put in place in the 
aftermath of the financial turmoil of 2008-2009 and the subsequent sovereign debt crisis, it is 
natural to ask whether the fiscal/political context might also affect the dynamics of human 
development.  
However, the existing studies have typically focused on the distributional effects of fiscal 
policy. For instance, Wolff and Zacharias (2007) emphasize that income inequality is significantly 
reduced via an increase in net government spending. Smeeding (2000, 2002) find a positive 
relationship between fiscal consolidation and both income gap and poverty at the individual (inter-
personal) level. Mulas-Granados (2005) shows that fiscal adjustments influence the trade-off 
between economic growth and income inequality. Using data for a panel of 18 industrialized 
countries over the period 1978-2009, Agnello and Sousa (2014) highlight that periods of fiscal 
consolidation are associated with a rise in income inequality. Moreover, while austerity measures 
that are driven by spending cuts are particularly detrimental for income distribution, tax hikes tend 
to be more equitative. Agnello et al. (2016) show that national fiscal consolidations can also be 
detrimental to the level income inequality across European regions, as adjustment programs 
increase the dispersion of regional income. 
Some related work in this area suggests that political freedom (Zavaleta, 2007; Alkire, 2008) 
and political abilities (Whitehead and Gray Molina, 2003) help to capture some of the time-
variation that we observe in a multivariate index of human development. Other authors look at the 
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effects of the economic crisis and the fiscal adjustments on health conditions in the Eurozone 
periphery, and find a negative effect (Gili et al., 2013; Roca et al., 2013; Vandoros et al., 2013; 
Zavras et al., 2013). Stuckler et al. (2009) uncover a favourable health trend during recessions and 
De Vogli (2014) shows that economic policies aimed at reducing income inequality and protecting 
the most disadvantaged groups of the population are effective at breaking the positive relationship 
between job losses and suicides. Kentikelenis et al. (2012), Fountoulakis et al. (2012), Karanikolos 
et al. (2013) and Antonakakis and Collins (2014a, 2014b) also find robust evidence of a positive 
link between fiscal consolidation and suicide mortality. In particular, Antonakakis and Collins 
(2014b) show that fiscal consolidation leads to an increase in suicide mortality, and this effect is 
gender, age and time-specific, that is, it affects more severely the male population, at the old age 
and over the long-run. 
Moreover, it is important to highlight that while the purpose and ultimate goal behind any 
economic policy intervention is to contribute to a more efficient allocation of resources, the core of 
the policy analysis areas has been explored via the quantification of the impact of macroeconomic 
policies on issues such as poverty reduction or unemployment or, to a less extent, on specific 
dimensions of economic development such as health and well-being (Subramanian et al., 2002; 
Acemoglu et al., 2003; Andrés, 2005; Suhrcke et al., 2006). For instance, Binder and Georgiadis 
(2010) investigate the determinants of economic development in a panel of 84 countries over the 
period 1970-2005. The authors emphasize the role played by macroeconomic policies and the 
differences in countries’ persistent characteristics, such as their social norms and institutions. 
Similarly, Islam (1995) and Evans (1996) emphasize the importance of the institutional and political 
environment. 
Yet, some relevant questions are still unanswered. What are the effects of fiscal 
consolidation measures on human development? Does the length of the fiscal consolidation process 
matter for the dynamics of human development?How important is the composition of fiscal 
consolidation? Are government spending cuts more likely to affect human development than tax 
9 
 
hikes? Is the impact of fiscal consolidation on human development substantially different between 
developed and developing countries? Thus, we consider a 'hidden' dimension of fiscal consolidation 
that has not been explored so far: its impact on human development. This is an important gap that 
we try to fill with the current study. 
 
3. Econometric Methodology 
We employ adynamic panel data approach to test for the impact of fiscal consolidation on 
the growth rate of the human development index (HDIgr). Therefore, we estimate the following 
model: 
 itititititititiit ConsolHDIgrHDIgr    RRφ'DRλ'Ecoθ'Polδ'1 ,(1) 
where itConsol  is a proxy for the fiscal consolidation variable for country i at time t, itPol  is a 
vector of political variables, itEco  is the set of macroeconomic determinants, itDR  is a vector that 
controls for social variables (i.e. demographic and religious variables), itRR  comprises information 
about the several dimensions of a country's rating risk, i  represents fixed-effects that capture 
unobserved country-specificdeterminants, and it isa white-noise residual satisfying the usual 
assumptions of zero mean and constant variance. 
Since human development displays persistence over time, a dynamic specification is more 
appropriate than a static model. For this reason, we include the lagged dependent variable among 
the set of control variables. An important advantage of such a dynamic model is that it allows usto 
distinguish between the short-term effectof each control variable (which is captured by the 
correspondingcoefficient in Equation (1), i.e. the parameter   and the parameter vectors δ , θ , λ  
and φ ) and its long-term effect (which can be computed as   1/ ,  1/δ ,  1/θ , 
 1/λ  and  1/φ , where   is the coefficient associated with the laggeddependent variable in 
Equation (1)).  
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We develop our analysis by considering the traditional fixed-effects (FE) panel data 
estimator, which makes it possible for us to control for unobserved heterogeneity across countries. 
Thus, it accounts for the (systematic) effects of time-invariant variables on the dependent variable.
1
 
While this estimator is usually biased and inconsistent when the model is dynamic, it is consistent 
as Tbecomes large. Given the relatively long time dimension of our sample (1970-2013), the bias 
due to the correlation between the lagged dependent variable and the country-specific effects is not 
problematic. Nevertheless, as a robustness check, we assessthe sensitivity of our results after 
accounting for potential outliers. Additionally, we employ the Instrumental Variable-Generalised 
Least Squares (IV-GLS), the Arellano and Bond (1991)'s difference-GMM estimatorsand the 
system-GMM estimator by Blundell and Bond (1998) to controlfor possible endogeneity 
concerns.Finally, we also confirm that our results are invariant to the statistical definition used in 
the identification of the fiscal consolidation episodes. 
 
4. Data 
We start by using a panel dataset consisting of 182 sovereign statesfor which data are 
available for a reasonably long time-series dimension However, the presence of missing values for 
the human development index reduces the number of countries to at most 91.Absence of 
information about political variables further limits the number of cross-sectional units to 81. 
Finally, the lack of data for fiscal variables, in particular, for the cyclically-adjusted budget balance 
(which is crucial for the identification of fiscal consolidation episodes) implies a reduction in the 
number of countries included in the sample to 72. These are listed in Table A of the Appendix. 
The Human Development Index(HDI) is a measure of the average achievement in key 
dimensions of human development, namely: 1) a long and healthy life; 2) being knowledgeable; and 
_____________________________ 
1 Binder et al. (2010) discuss a state-dependent dynamic panel data model with multivariate conditioning. With the aim 
of assessing the effects of economic policies on human development, Binder and Georgiadis (2010) consider a panel 
autoregressive distributed lag model and an error-correction representation that features long-run homogeneity for 
countries that share the same conditioning factors and country-specific short-run dynamics. The authors highlight the 
numerous advantages of this panel modelling framework, but acknowledge that it is appropriate when the number of 
regressors is small and the time-series dimension of the dataset for each country is large. 
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3) a decent standard of living. The HDI index is the geometric mean of normalized indices for each 
of the three dimensions is data are provided by the United Nations Development Programme.
2
 
Several fiscal consolidation variables are considered in the analysis. In order to identify 
fiscal consolidation episodes, we follow Alesina and Ardagna’s (1998) approach. The authors focus 
on periods of fiscal consolidation (stimulus) as years in which the cyclically-adjusted budget 
balance improves (deteriorates) by at least 1.5 per cent of GDP. This procedure discards small, 
albeit prolonged, consolidation/stimulus episodes and rather tracks sharp and large adjustments in 
the fiscal stance. In this way, it avoids picking up years of "cyclical" adjustment in the budget 
balance, therefore, years of "business as usual" (Alesina and Ardagna (2010)).
3
 Having identified 
these events, we focus on the following set of variables: 
 Consolidation: It is a dummy variable that takes the value of one in all the 
yearsduring which a fiscal consolidation program is implemented, and zero 
otherwise. 
 Dur_Consol: It is a variable that simply counts, for each year, the duration (in years) 
of the fiscal consolidation program since it has been implemented. 
 Spend_Consol: It is a dummy variable that takes the value of one in all the years 
during which a spending-driven fiscal consolidation is implemented, and zero 
otherwise. This is defined as the change in primary expenditure (as a percentage of 
GDP) that is larger than 50% of the overall change in the CAPB (as a percentage of 
GDP). 
_____________________________ 
2 For a more detailed description of the human development index, see Binder and Georgiadis (2010). 
3We should add that our results are invariant to the statistical definition used to identify fiscal consolidation episodes. In 
fact, the empirical findings remain qualitatively unchanged when we rely instead on Giavazzi and Pagano’s (1996) 
approach (under which a fiscal episode consists of a change in the CAPB of at least 2 percent of GDP in one year or at 
least 1.5 percent on average in the last two years). For brevity, these results are not reported in the paper, but are 
available upon request. Moreover, Alesina and Ardagna (2010) consider an alternative definition of fiscal consolidation 
(stimulus), which is defined as a period in which the cyclically-adjusted budget balance improves (deteriorates) by at 
least 1 per cent of GDP over two consecutive years. We focus on large single-year fiscal adjustments instead of these 
large multi-year fiscal adjustments, which, by being based on a more restrictive definition, imply a substantial reduction 
in the number of episodes.  
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 Dur_Spend_Consol: It is a variable that merely counts, for each year, the duration (in 
years) of a spending-driven fiscal consolidation program since it has been 
implemented. 
 Tax_Consol: It is a dummy variable that takes the value of one in all the years during 
which a tax-driven fiscal consolidation is implemented, and zero otherwise.This is 
defined as the change in government revenue (as a percentage of GDP) that is larger 
than 50% of the overall change in the CAPB (as a percentage of GDP). 
 Dur_Tax_Consol: It is a variable that simply counts, for each year, the duration (in 
years) of a tax-driven fiscal consolidation program since it has been implemented. 
The set of political conditionings (Pol) is provided by the International Country Risk Guide 
(ICRG) and the Polity IV database and includes the following variables: 
 GovStab: Government stability, which measures the government’s ability to carry 
out its declared program(s) and its stability to stay in office.
4
We expect higher 
government stability to be associated with stronger human development. 
 Polity2: This variable describes the strength of democracy of a country and should 
be positively linked with the growth of the HDI index.
5
 
The set of macroeconomic variables (Eco) is gathered from the International Monetary 
Fund’s (IMF) International Financial Statistics (IFS) and includes:6 
 GovCons_pc: The log of per capita public consumption, which captures aspects of 
aspects of fiscal policy that may affect human development. 
_____________________________ 
4 The assigned risk rating is the sum of three sub-components (i.e. government unity, legislative strength and popular 
support), each with a maximum score of four points and a minimum score of zero points. A score of four points equates 
to "Very Low Risk" and a score of zero points denotes "Very High Risk". 
5 This variable is computed as the difference between the country's score in an "Autocracy" index and its score in a 
"Democracy" index. This leads to a polity scale ranging from -10 (strongly autocratic) to +10 (strongly democratic). 
6 For a review of the theoretical mechanisms via which government consumption, investment and external trade can 
affect long-run GDP, see Binder et al. (2010). 
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 GovInv_pc: The log of per capita public investment, i.e. public gross-fixed capital 
formation, which also tracks the dynamics of a component of fiscal policy that can 
influence human development. 
 PrivInv_pc: The log of per capita private investment, i.e. private gross-fixed capital 
formation, which encompasses different policy incentives for saving and investment 
decisions of the private sector that can have an impact on human development. 
 Openness: The log of the degree of openness, i.e. imports plus exports over GDP, 
which takes into account various policy measures aimed at stimulating international 
trade, with potential effects on the growth of HDI index.  
 Inflation: Inflation rate (in percentage) which, by affecting disproportionally those at 
the bottom of the income distribution, can negatively impinge on human 
development. 
To control for demographic and religious issues (DR), we also include the following 
variables among the set of regressors: 
 UrbanPop: The log of urban population, which can be thought as a proxy for the size 
of the population, and is collected from the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators (WDI).
7
 
 ReligiousTensions: It measures the degree of the religious tensions, which can be an 
obstacle to human development, and is provided by the International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG).
8
 
Finally, we control for the rating risk (RR) at the economic, financial and political levels.
9
 
High economic, financial and political risk are associated with environments of uncertainty, which 
_____________________________ 
7 Binder and Georgiadis (2010) consider the role of social inequality (as proxied by gender inequality), as it can be an 
obstacle of the progress of human development to its potential (United Nations, 1995). 
8 This variable is measured in a scale from 0 to 6. Religious tensions may stem from the domination of society and/or 
governance by a single religious group that seeks to replace civil law by religious law and to exclude other religions 
from the political and/or social process; the desire of a single religious group to dominate governance; the suppression 
of religious freedom; and the desire of a religious group to express its own identity, separate from the country as a 
whole. Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004) show that religious affinities are a robust driver of economic growth. 
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can be detrimental for economic growth, thus, human development. The data for the respective 
variables were collected from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) and are defined as 
follows: 
 EcoRiskRating: The economic risk rating index includes annual inflation rate, budget 
balance as a percentage of GDP, current account as a percentage of GDP, GDP per 
head and real GDP growth.  
 FinRiskRating: The financial risk rating index includes current account as a 
percentage of exports of goods and services, exchange rate stability, foreign debt as a 
percentage of GDP, foreign debt service as a percentage of exports of goods and 
services, and net international liquidity as months of import cover.  
 PolRiskRating: The political risk rating index includes the investment profile (that 
accounts for factors affecting the risk to investment that are not covered by other 
economic and financial risk components), government stability (which attempts to 
capture the extent to which the government is able to carry out its policies, as well as 
its ability to stay in office), and a measure of socioeconomic conditions (to assess the 
socio-economic pressures, which could constrain government action or fuel social 
discontent). 
 
5. Empirical Results 
In this section, we present and discuss the empirical results. We start by investigating 
whether fiscal consolidation impacts on human development (section 5.1). We then broadenthe 
scope of our analysis by assessing the extent to which such relationship depends on the composition 
of fiscal consolidation i.e. whether austerity packages that are led by spending cuts or by tax hikes 
matter for human development (section 5.2). Additionally, we explore the sensitivity of the results 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
9In general terms, if the points awarded are less than 50% of the total, that component can be considered as very high 
risk. If the points are in the 50-60% range it is high risk, in the 60%-70% range moderate risk, in the 70-80% range low 
risk and in the 80-100% range very low risk. 
15 
 
to different samples of countries (sections 5.3 and 5.4). Finally, we consider alternative estimators 
(section 5.5). 
 
5.1. Human Development and Fiscal Consolidation 
We begin by analysing the effect of fiscal consolidation on human development. The results 
are summarized in Table 1. In Column 1, we test for the dependence of the human development 
process on the occurrence of fiscal consolidation episodes. Then, we assess the statistical 
significance of a set of political (Column 2), macroeconomic and social variables (Columns 3 and 
4), and country risk indicators (Column 5). Finally, we replace the fiscal consolidation dummy 
variable Consolidation with the discrete variables Dur_Consol(Column 6)to control for the 
influence of the length of the fiscal consolidation program (i.e. to account for the duration effects). 
Column 1 indicates that the implementation of fiscal consolidation programs generates an 
adverse outcome for human development. In particular, the negative sign of the coefficient 
associated with the consolidation dummy variable (-0.0675) suggests that fiscal adjustments are 
detrimental for human development: the growth rate of the HDI index falls by around 0.07 
percentage points when a fiscal consolidation episode occurs. This evidence is consistent with the 
view that although pressures to control the public deficit may force governments to implement large 
fiscal adjustment plans with the aim of improving the cyclically-adjusted budget balance, cuts in 
growth-enhancing public expenditure -such as, capital investment and social spending- and tax 
hikes typically affect low-income classes and the most vulnerable categories of the population. 
Thus, by negatively impacting on living standards, health services and educational attainment (i.e. 
the three key dimension of the human development index), austerity measures undermine the 
human development process. 
Looking at the estimates reported in Columns 2-5, we note that the negative effect of fiscal 
consolidation on human development remains sizeable and highly significant even when additional 
control variables are gradually included in the model. More specifically and depending on the 
16 
 
model specification, fiscal austerity programs lead to a fall of the HDI growth rate that ranges 
between -0.11 to -0.13 percentage points. 
Among the set of institutional variables, we uncover an important role for government 
stability. The high statistical significance of the coefficient associated with the variable 
GovStabsuggests that a stronger ability of the government to stay in office and to carry out its 
policies is beneficial for the development of nations. 
Despite not being statistically significant, we also note that the coefficient associated with 
the variable Polity2 enters with positive sign. This is consistent with the view that, by promoting 
dignity and fundamental rights of an individual, democracy instils social justice and can be regarded 
as a potential driver of social and economic development (United Nations, 2002). 
The results summarized in Columns 3-4 suggest that macroeconomic conditions also matter 
for human development. In particular, government consumption enters the model with a negative 
sign, while the coefficients associated with the public and private investment in physical capital are 
positive, thus, corroborating the findings of Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2003). In addition, inflation 
negatively impacts on human development, which is consistent with the view that low inflation 
provides a stable framework for long-term decision making and boosts the development of nations. 
The evidence that the macroeconomic environment is fundamental to human development is 
also confirmed by the results reported in Column 5. In fact, the sign and the significance of the 
coefficient associated with the economic risk rating indicator show that the better the economic 
assessment (i.e. the higher the value of the index), the larger the amount of money that institutional 
and international investors (i.e. banks, commercial partners and multinational corporations) decide 
to save and/or invest in a specific country with positive effects for human development. 
Interestingly, our estimates also show that the economic risk outweighs both political and financial 
risks (with arenever statistically significant). Thus, it seems that a poor political risk rating is 
compensated by a better economic risk rating. As a result, a one point increase in the economic risk 
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rating index significantly increases the growth rate of human development by about 0.02 percentage 
points.  
The results concerning the social variables show that their statistical significance varies 
across model specifications (Columns 4-6). As such, they do not provide a clear cut answer about 
the importance of urban population and religious tensions in terms of shaping human development. 
In Column 6, it can be seen that long-lasting austerity programs are harmful for human 
development. In fact, the duration of fiscal consolidation measures has a negative and significant 
effect on the dependent variable. The major conclusions regarding the role of political and 
economic factors remain unchanged. 
Finally, all Columns show that human development growth exhibits a reasonable degree of 
persistence, as the coefficient associated to the lagged dependent variable is highly significant. This 
evidence holds regardless of the model specification and, therefore,it supports the use of the 
dynamic panel framework. Moreover, it can be seen that the coefficient associated with the lagged 
dependent variable ranges between 0.51 and 0.71, which implies that the long-termeffects of the 
various control variables on the growth of human development are, approximately, 1.41 to 1.96 
times larger than the short-term effects. 
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
5.2. Human Development and Composition of Fiscal Consolidation 
Our previous empirical findings show that the adoption of fiscal austerity plans is 
detrimental for human development per se. However, one interesting question remains: to which 
extent dosuch negative effects depend on whether fiscal consolidation is led by tax hikes and 
spending cuts? To address this question, we distinguishbetween spending- and tax-drivenausterity 
programmes depending on which side of the fiscal stance (i.e. either tax hikes or expenditure cuts as 
a percentage of GDP) prevails. Then, we replacethe fiscal consolidation dummy variable with the 
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two alternative dummy variables presented in Section 4 (i.e. Spend_Consol and Tax_Consol) and 
re-estimate model (1).  
The results are shown in Tables 2and 3.Interestingly, we find that the HDI growth rate 
substantially declines when fiscal consolidation is achieved via spending cuts (Table 2), while it is 
not significantly affected by tax-driven austerity programmes (Table 3). More specifically, 
regardless the model specification, the coefficients associated with spending-driven consolidations 
are always highly significant and negative: Columns 1-5 show that during periods of large 
adjustments in government spending, the change of the HDI growth rate ranges between -0.13 and -
0.21 percentage points, i.e. higher than the estimates reported in Table 1. By contrast, the 
coefficients linked with tax-driven fiscal adjustments and reported in Table 3 are smaller and 
notstatistically significant, thereby, suggesting that their impact on human development growth is 
negligible.  
From a policymaking point of view, these results suggest that development-friendly fiscal 
consolidations can be pursued by ending with the austerity programmes that mainly focus on 
expenditure cuts, notably in social areas (such as pensions, health services or family benefits) in 
favour of fiscal packages consisting of measures aimed at increasing public revenues (for instance, 
by taxing higher income categories and property wealth more strongly). The estimates reported in 
Column 6 of Tables 2 and 3 support our conclusion that, regardless the composition of 
consolidation plans, excessively prolonged periods of consolidation are detrimental for HDI.  
Finally, we note that our main conclusions regarding the importance of political and 
economic determinants of human development remain qualitatively unchanged and validate the 
general predictions of the baseline model (Table 1). Similarly, the statistical significance of the 
lagged dependent variable corroborates the use of a dynamic model specification, and the 
coefficient magnitudes of such variable confirm that the long-termimpact of spending-driven fiscal 
consolidation episodes (as well as of other control variables) is almost twice as large as its short-
term effect. 
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[Insert Table 2 here] 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
5.3. A Look at the Composition of Human Development: Education, Health and GNI 
In this Section, we look at the composition of the human development index. As highlighted 
before, this index is computed using three indices: (i) the education index; (ii) the life expectancy 
index; and (iii) the Gross National Income (GNI) index. The education index captures the 
"knowledge" dimension of human development and is based on indicators, such as the mean years 
of schooling and the expected years of schooling. A "long and health life" dimension of human 
development is tracked by the life expectancy index, using information about life expectancy at 
birth. Finally, the GNI index assesses the existence of a "decent standard of living" on the basis of 
data on GNI per capita (PPP in US dollars). 
To investigate the effects of fiscal consolidation on the composition of human development, 
we re-estimate Equation (1) by replacing the human development index with each sub-component 
of human development.A summary of the main findings is provided in Tables 4 (i.e.the education 
index), 5 (i.e. the life expectancy index) and 6 (i.e. the GNI index). 
Table 4 confirms that fiscal consolidation has a detrimental and significant impact on the 
education index, which is stronger in the case of spending-driven fiscal adjustments than tax-driven 
austerity programmes. In what concerns the life expectancy index (Table 5), we do not uncover any 
significant effect of fiscal consolidation on human development. In fact, neither the fiscal 
consolidation dummy variables, nor the duration of the fiscal adjustments is significant. Finally, 
Table 6 shows that fiscal consolidation negatively impinges on GNI, even though the composition 
of fiscal adjustments does not seem to significantly affect human development. Finally, it should be 
noted that all Tables reveal that the lagged dependent variable is statistically significant, which 
corroborates the use of a dynamic panel framework. 
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All in all, these results suggest that fiscal adjustments are particularly damaging for the 
education dimension of human development, less so for GNI and do not seem to cause a 
deterioration of life expectancy. Despite this, these findings need to be interpreted with caution, as 
the use of each sub-component of the human development index in the econometric framework 
implies a substantial reduction of the number of usable data points. 
 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
5.3. Evidence for OECD and Non-OECD countries 
In Tables 7 and 8, we replicate the estimation of model (1) for developed (OECD) and 
developing (non-OECD) countries. Some interesting differences between the two groups emerge. 
While fiscal consolidation does not normally affect the human development process in OECD 
countries, developing countries experience a significant decline in the growth rate of HDI during 
austerity periods. This might be the result of the more growth-friendly nature of fiscal consolidation 
programmes adopted by developed countries. 
As for the importance of the core set of economic, political and institutional determinants, 
we find that while the economic environment (as reflected by the economic risk rating index) 
matters for both country groups, political stability is an important driver of human development in 
non-OECDcountries only. Nevertheless, the evidence concerning the contribution of 
macroeconomic variables to HDI growth is less clear-cut: although those tend to enter with the 
correct sign, their statistical significance varies across the two samples and alternative model 
specifications. This makes it difficult to provide specific policy prescriptions aimed at improving 
human development in OECD and non-OECD countries. 
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[Insert Table 7 here] 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
 
5.4. Regional Analysis 
We now extent the analysis presented in section 5.3 by assessing whether the strength of the 
relationship between fiscal consolidation and human development growth varies across regions.  
For the sake of space, each column of Table 9only reports the coefficients associated to the fiscal 
consolidation dummy variables obtained after the estimation of model (1) for different country sub-
samples (i.e. advanced economies (ADV), emerging markets(EME) and low-income countries 
(LIC)) and then by specific geographical regions (namely, Asia-Pacific (AP), Europe (EUR), 
MiddleEast and Central Asia (MECA), Sub-Saharan Africa (AFR) and Western Hemisphere 
(WH)).  
Even though results should be interpreted cautiously due to the limited number of 
observations, we confirm that fiscal consolidation plans, and particularly those led by expenditure 
cuts, are harmful for human development in emerging countries. By contrast, the human 
development process in advanced economies and, notably, in European countries (Column 5) seems 
to be resistant to fiscal adjustments. Among the group of developing countries, human development 
in African countries is hit more strongly by fiscal consolidation episodes than Asia-Pacificcountries. 
 
[Insert Table 9 here] 
 
5.5. Robustness 
In this section, we subject our results to robustness checks that include the inspection of 
potential outliers and accounting for endogeneity. On the former, we use the Least Absolute 
Deviation (LAD) robust estimator. On the latter, we use a panel Instrumental Variable-Generalised 
Least Squares (IV-GLS) approach, which is then complemented by Arellano and Bond (1991)'s 
22 
 
difference Generalised Methods of Moments (GMM) and the system-GMM estimator by Blundell 
and Bond (1998). As is standard in the literature, the set of instruments includesthe first lag of the 
right-hand side variables and the second lag of the dependent variable. 
The results are shown in Tables10 and 11 for a selection of our fiscal consolidation 
variables, namely, the fiscal consolidation dummy variable, its composition (i.e. spending versus 
tax-driven fiscal adjustments) and its duration. The baseline equation includes the core of political, 
economic and social determinants of human development. While the magnitude of the coefficient 
estimates in Columns 1-4 is slightly reduced once outliers have been excluded from the sample, the 
negative impact of fiscal consolidation and its duration remain statistically significant. Moreover, 
we confirm that fiscal adjustments that are driven by cuts in government spending have a 
particularly detrimental effect on the growth rate of HDI. 
When we account for possible endogeneity, the results are qualitatively similar but now the 
magnitude of the estimated coefficient of interest is higher. Particularly in the case of the 
difference-GMM and the system-GMM estimators (see Table 11), the coefficient estimates for the 
impact of spending-driven fiscal consolidations almost doubles compared to the obtained estimates 
in Table 1.  
 
[Insert Table 10 here] 
[Insert Table 11 here] 
 
6. Conclusion 
With the emergence of the sovereign debt crisis, unprecedented fiscal austerity measures and 
bailout packages started to be implemented in many developed countries. These fiscal consolidation 
programs included large spending cuts, privatization of publicly owned assets, tax hikesand 
structural reforms, and were designed with the aim of achievingfiscal sustainability of public debt, 
promoting economic growth and restoring competitiveness.Despite this, today, many policymakers 
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not only question the effectiveness of such measures, but also admit that they caused suffer to 
various economic and social dimensions of human development. 
In the current work, we investigate the impact of fiscal consolidation on human 
development. Our results clearly show that fiscal austerity leads toa significant fall in the growth 
rate of the HDI index. This negative effect is particularly strong in the case of spending-driven 
consolidation episodes, even though tax-driven austerity measures do not seem to affect human 
development in a significant manner. Fiscal consolidation is also especially deleterious in 
developing countries (namely, African and Asia-Pacific countries), which end up experiencing a 
large deterioration of human development during austerity times. 
Additionally, the empirical evidence suggests that: (i) government stability is a crucial 
politico-institutional determinant of human development; and (ii) among the set of macroeconomic 
indicators, government investment in physical capital is beneficial for human development, but 
government consumption and inflation have a detrimental effect.As a result, the ability of the 
government to conduct its policy in a stable political environment has a positive impact on human 
development. Moreover, low inflation and high government investment ratestend to boost 
humandevelopment. 
From a policy perspective, our findings suggest that fiscal consolidation programs that are 
led by tax hikes are less likely to cause a deterioration of human development than spending-driven 
fiscal consolidation. Therefore, governments should favor measures, such as more progressivity of 
taxation or higher property taxes (i.e. measures aimed at increasing public revenue) and refrain from 
cutting social expenditure and expenditure in education and health (i.e. measures designed to reduce 
government spending). Otherwise, human development will no longer be the "hidden" face of fiscal 
austerity, but rather its most "visible" one. 
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List of Tables 
 
Table 1. Baseline model. 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
HDI_gr(-1) 0.7134*** 0.6220*** 0.5546*** 0.5494*** 0.5115*** 0.5094*** 
 (0.0344) (0.0437) (0.0525) (0.0543) (0.0529) (0.0527) 
GovStab  0.0203*** 0.0195** 0.0221*** 0.0225*** 0.0228*** 
  (0.0075) (0.0086) (0.0079) (0.0078) (0.0079) 
Polity2  0.0040 0.0108 0.0129 0.0113 0.0112 
  (0.0049) (0.0081) (0.0083) (0.0089) (0.0089) 
GovCons_pc   -0.1379** -0.1382** -0.1134* -0.1155* 
   (0.0583) (0.0564) (0.0601) (0.0596) 
GovInv_pc   0.1082** 0.1128** 0.0641 0.0654 
   (0.0494) (0.0461) (0.0387) (0.0393) 
PrivInv_pc   0.0322 0.0328 0.0427 0.0433 
   (0.0680) (0.0695) (0.0615) (0.0610) 
Openness   0.0125 0.0078 -0.0095 -0.0097 
   (0.0538) (0.0581) (0.0622) (0.0614) 
Inflation   -0.0018 -0.0023* -0.0007 -0.0007 
   (0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0014) (0.0014) 
UrbanPop    -0.0640 -0.1459 -0.1476 
    (0.1009) (0.0987) (0.0997) 
ReligiousTensions    -0.0579** -0.0519 -0.0522 
    (0.0266) (0.0315) (0.0316) 
EcoRiskRating     0.0171*** 0.0173*** 
     (0.0042) (0.0042) 
FinRiskRating     0.0029 0.0029 
     (0.0028) (0.0028) 
PolRiskRating     -0.0042 -0.0042 
     (0.0028) (0.0028) 
Consolidation -0.0675* -0.1238*** -0.1338*** -0.1288*** -0.1126*** - 
 (0.0348) (0.0328) (0.0413) (0.0427) (0.0360) - 
Dur_Consol  - - - - -0.0701*** 
  - - - - (0.0171) 
Constant 0.2266*** 0.1320*** 0.2924 1.6686 2.4363 2.4634 
 (0.0282) (0.0418) (0.2994) (1.5373) (1.5459) (1.5586) 
Observations 2,647 2,198 1,730 1,730 1,726 1,726 
R-squared 0.5351 0.4254 0.3799 0.3846 0.3683 0.3693 
Number of countries 91 
81 72 72 72 72 
 Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 2. Spending-driven fiscal consolidation episodes. 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
HDI_gr(-1) 0.7115*** 0.6177*** 0.5488*** 0.5437*** 0.5082*** 0.5089*** 
 (0.0347) (0.0446) (0.0533) (0.0549) (0.0536) (0.0541) 
GovStab  0.0199*** 0.0190** 0.0218*** 0.0223*** 0.0220*** 
  (0.0074) (0.0085) (0.0078) (0.0078) (0.0078) 
Polity2  0.0044 0.0115 0.0138 0.0121 0.0119 
  (0.0051) (0.0083) (0.0086) (0.0090) (0.0090) 
GovCons_pc   -0.1366** -0.1375** -0.1141* -0.1150* 
   (0.0605) (0.0587) (0.0620) (0.0625) 
GovInv_pc   0.1008** 0.1056** 0.0603 0.0644* 
   (0.0474) (0.0443) (0.0378) (0.0381) 
PrivInv_pc   0.0374 0.0388 0.0475 0.0447 
   (0.0694) (0.0710) (0.0631) (0.0638) 
Openness   0.0134 0.0124 -0.0075 -0.0157 
   (0.0538) (0.0583) (0.0626) (0.0608) 
Inflation   -0.0016 -0.0022* -0.0007 -0.0006 
   (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0014) (0.0014) 
UrbanPop    -0.0776 -0.1498 -0.1517 
    (0.0997) (0.0990) (0.0996) 
ReligiousTensions    -0.0586** -0.0527* -0.0540* 
    (0.0267) (0.0314) (0.0312) 
EcoRiskRating     0.0165*** 0.0167*** 
     (0.0042) (0.0042) 
FinRiskRating     0.0024 0.0024 
     (0.0028) (0.0028) 
PolRiskRating     -0.0040 -0.0038 
     (0.0028) (0.0028) 
Spend_Consol -0.1257*** -0.1867*** -0.2113*** -0.2095*** -0.1654*** - 
 (0.0400) (0.0513) (0.0685) (0.0691) (0.0601) - 
Dur_Spend_Consol  - - - - -0.0798** 
  - - - - (0.0333) 
Constant 0.2280*** 0.1345*** 0.2701 1.8612 2.5170 2.5789 
 (0.0289) (0.0414) (0.2991) (1.5186) (1.5475) (1.5560) 
Observations 2,647 2,198 1,730 1,730 1,726 1,726 
R-squared 0.5360 0.4268 0.3814 0.3864 0.3688 0.3670 
Number of countries 91 81 72 72 72 72 
 Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 3. Tax-driven fiscal consolidation episodes. 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
HDI_gr(-1) 0.7137*** 0.6247*** 0.5582*** 0.5527*** 0.5136*** 0.5133*** 
 (0.0348) (0.0445) (0.0537) (0.0555) (0.0533) (0.0529) 
GovStab  0.0200*** 0.0200** 0.0228*** 0.0222*** 0.0227*** 
  (0.0073) (0.0084) (0.0078) (0.0077) (0.0077) 
Polity2  0.0033 0.0105 0.0128 0.0109 0.0107 
  (0.0049) (0.0081) (0.0083) (0.0089) (0.0088) 
GovCons_pc   -0.1327** -0.1332** -0.1087* -0.1097* 
   (0.0572) (0.0558) (0.0596) (0.0588) 
GovInv_pc   0.1123** 0.1168** 0.0669* 0.0676* 
   (0.0481) (0.0452) (0.0372) (0.0374) 
PrivInv_pc   0.0235 0.0247 0.0356 0.0355 
   (0.0699) (0.0717) (0.0622) (0.0613) 
Openness   -0.0036 -0.0063 -0.0221 -0.0209 
   (0.0509) (0.0561) (0.0600) (0.0602) 
Inflation   -0.0016 -0.0021* -0.0005 -0.0005 
   (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0014) (0.0014) 
UrbanPop    -0.0724 -0.1530 -0.1519 
    (0.1024) (0.0995) (0.0996) 
ReligiousTensions    -0.0591** -0.0542* -0.0536* 
    (0.0262) (0.0312) (0.0312) 
EcoRiskRating     0.0176*** 0.0179*** 
     (0.0042) (0.0042) 
FinRiskRating     0.0027 0.0029 
     (0.0029) (0.0028) 
PolRiskRating     -0.0038 -0.0040 
     (0.0028) (0.0028) 
Tax_Consol 0.0122 -0.0306 -0.0387 -0.0306 -0.0468 - 
 (0.0493) (0.0416) (0.0490) (0.0485) (0.0471) - 
Dur_Tax_Consol  - - - - -0.0473** 
  - - - - (0.0192) 
Constant 0.2181*** 0.1234*** 0.3511 1.8654 2.5759 2.5452 
 (0.0282) (0.0411) (0.2948) (1.5568) (1.5553) (1.5572) 
Observations 2,647 2,198 1,730 1,730 1,726 1,726 
R-squared 0.5342 0.4215 0.3755 0.3805 0.3652 0.3661 
Number of countries 91 81 72 72 72 72 
 Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 4. Education index. 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Education_gr(-1) 0.5935*** 0.5917*** 0.5934*** 0.5936*** 0.5962*** 0.5950*** 
 (0.0451) (0.0449) (0.0454) (0.0458) (0.0455) (0.0453) 
GovStab 0.0360*** 0.0366*** 0.0355*** 0.0351*** 0.0356*** 0.0366*** 
 (0.0127) (0.0128) (0.0126) (0.0125) (0.0127) (0.0129) 
Polity2 0.0283** 0.0283** 0.0293** 0.0290** 0.0272** 0.0270** 
 (0.0116) (0.0116) (0.0117) (0.0116) (0.0116) (0.0115) 
GovCons_pc 0.0071 0.0045 0.0098 0.0085 0.0138 0.0123 
 (0.1365) (0.1358) (0.1404) (0.1415) (0.1351) (0.1337) 
GovInv_pc 0.0764 0.0784 0.0708 0.0770 0.0831 0.0842 
 (0.0785) (0.0796) (0.0768) (0.0766) (0.0756) (0.0761) 
PrivInv_pc -0.1051 -0.1049 -0.1015 -0.1058 -0.1178 -0.1180 
 (0.1453) (0.1442) (0.1500) (0.1509) (0.1459) (0.1445) 
Openness 0.0635 0.0629 0.0616 0.0493 0.0420 0.0437 
 (0.1170) (0.1166) (0.1163) (0.1142) (0.1138) (0.1145) 
Inflation 0.0034* 0.0033* 0.0034* 0.0035* 0.0036* 0.0035* 
 (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0019) 
UrbanPop -0.6255*** -0.6298*** -0.6352*** -0.6380*** -0.6342*** -0.6340*** 
 (0.1515) (0.1538) (0.1532) (0.1546) (0.1540) (0.1547) 
ReligiousTensions -0.0066 -0.0067 -0.0083 -0.0104 -0.0104 -0.0095 
 (0.0446) (0.0449) (0.0435) (0.0433) (0.0441) (0.0445) 
EcoRiskRating 0.0086 0.0090 0.0078 0.0081 0.0098 0.0103 
 (0.0067) (0.0066) (0.0070) (0.0070) (0.0068) (0.0068) 
FinRiskRating 0.0027 0.0026 0.0019 0.0019 0.0027 0.0029 
 (0.0047) (0.0046) (0.0046) (0.0046) (0.0046) (0.0046) 
PolRiskRating 0.0002 0.0001 0.0007 0.0010 0.0007 0.0004 
 (0.0043) (0.0043) (0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0043) 
Consolidation -0.2069***      
 (0.0707)      
Dur_Consol  -0.1266***     
  (0.0352)     
Spend_Consol   -0.2403***    
   (0.0875)    
Dur_Spend_Consol    -0.1124***   
    (0.0406)   
Tax_Consol     -0.1500  
     (0.1293)  
Dur_Tax_Consol      -0.1114* 
      (0.0622) 
Constant 9.6280*** 9.6918*** 9.8194*** 9.9100*** 9.8069*** 9.7805*** 
 (2.3081) (2.3436) (2.3396) (2.3651) (2.3555) (2.3614) 
Observations 1,726 1,726 1,726 1,726 1,726 1,726 
R-squared 0.3931 0.3938 0.3923 0.3912 0.3910 0.3918 
Number of countries 72 72 72 72 72 72 
 Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 5. Life expectancy index. 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Health_gr(-1) 0.5525*** 0.5528*** 0.5528*** 0.5527*** 0.5523*** 0.5526*** 
 (0.2065) (0.2065) (0.2065) (0.2065) (0.2065) (0.2064) 
GovStab 0.0133 0.0132 0.0133 0.0133 0.0132 0.0131 
 (0.0110) (0.0110) (0.0111) (0.0111) (0.0110) (0.0111) 
Polity2 0.0105 0.0105 0.0105 0.0106 0.0107 0.0107 
 (0.0122) (0.0122) (0.0122) (0.0122) (0.0122) (0.0122) 
GovCons_pc -0.1214 -0.1212 -0.1217 -0.1222 -0.1219 -0.1216 
 (0.0997) (0.0999) (0.0999) (0.1003) (0.1000) (0.0999) 
GovInv_pc 0.0808 0.0801 0.0800 0.0794 0.0792 0.0792 
 (0.0563) (0.0562) (0.0560) (0.0561) (0.0561) (0.0561) 
PrivInv_pc 0.0510 0.0514 0.0520 0.0530 0.0532 0.0529 
 (0.0823) (0.0829) (0.0826) (0.0830) (0.0833) (0.0831) 
Openness -0.0719 -0.0708 -0.0697 -0.0685 -0.0694 -0.0695 
 (0.0769) (0.0762) (0.0765) (0.0759) (0.0757) (0.0757) 
Inflation 0.0026 0.0026 0.0026 0.0025 0.0026 0.0026 
 (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0022) 
UrbanPop 0.1910* 0.1925* 0.1940* 0.1944* 0.1910* 0.1921* 
 (0.1060) (0.1064) (0.1065) (0.1063) (0.1058) (0.1060) 
ReligiousTensions -0.1450** -0.1446** -0.1443** -0.1441** -0.1447** -0.1446** 
 (0.0613) (0.0611) (0.0611) (0.0611) (0.0612) (0.0611) 
EcoRiskRating 0.0050 0.0050 0.0050 0.0049 0.0048 0.0047 
 (0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0041) (0.0041) 
FinRiskRating 0.0008 0.0009 0.0009 0.0009 0.0007 0.0008 
 (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0029) (0.0029) 
PolRiskRating -0.0060 -0.0061 -0.0062 -0.0062 -0.0061 -0.0060 
 (0.0046) (0.0047) (0.0046) (0.0047) (0.0046) (0.0047) 
Consolidation 0.0309      
 (0.0272)      
Dur_Consol  0.0119     
  (0.0117)     
Spend_Consol   0.0060    
   (0.0372)    
Dur_Spend_Consol    -0.0067   
    (0.0260)   
Tax_Consol     0.0534  
     (0.0411)  
Dur_Tax_Consol      0.0225 
      (0.0193) 
Constant -1.6445 -1.6714 -1.6980 -1.7043 -1.6416 -1.6591 
 (1.5773) (1.5736) (1.5758) (1.5707) (1.5689) (1.5666) 
Observations 1,812 1,812 1,812 1,812 1,812 1,812 
R-squared 0.4061 0.4061 0.4060 0.4060 0.4062 0.4061 
Number of countries 72 72 72 72 72 72 
 Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 6. GNI index. 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Income_gr(-1) 0.2738*** 0.2736*** 0.2706*** 0.2718*** 0.2737*** 0.2742*** 
 (0.0881) (0.0881) (0.0877) (0.0879) (0.0869) (0.0872) 
GovStab 0.0042 0.0046 0.0040 0.0037 0.0039 0.0041 
 (0.0119) (0.0120) (0.0120) (0.0121) (0.0119) (0.0119) 
Polity2 -0.0074 -0.0075 -0.0064 -0.0068 -0.0078 -0.0079 
 (0.0093) (0.0093) (0.0092) (0.0092) (0.0092) (0.0092) 
GovCons_pc -0.3100*** -0.3117*** -0.3132*** -0.3143*** -0.3075*** -0.3075*** 
 (0.0748) (0.0748) (0.0757) (0.0753) (0.0735) (0.0734) 
GovInv_pc 0.1558*** 0.1570*** 0.1507*** 0.1560*** 0.1602*** 0.1606*** 
 (0.0501) (0.0499) (0.0508) (0.0507) (0.0518) (0.0514) 
PrivInv_pc 0.1691** 0.1695** 0.1781** 0.1742** 0.1629** 0.1623** 
 (0.0766) (0.0767) (0.0794) (0.0784) (0.0747) (0.0746) 
Openness -0.0154 -0.0161 -0.0069 -0.0167 -0.0270 -0.0267 
 (0.0881) (0.0880) (0.0911) (0.0891) (0.0857) (0.0858) 
Inflation -0.0161*** -0.0162*** -0.0162*** -0.0162*** -0.0159*** -0.0159*** 
 (0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0036) 
(0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0036) 
UrbanPop 0.2118 0.2090 0.2085 0.2008 0.1981 0.2001 
 (0.1630) (0.1630) (0.1603) (0.1606) (0.1642) (0.1634) 
ReligiousTensions -0.0043 -0.0044 -0.0037 -0.0058 -0.0073 -0.0069 
 (0.0414) (0.0414) (0.0418) (0.0416) (0.0415) (0.0414) 
EcoRiskRating 0.0336*** 0.0338*** 0.0326*** 0.0329*** 0.0340*** 0.0342*** 
 (0.0100) (0.0100) (0.0100) (0.0101) (0.0100) (0.0101) 
FinRiskRating 0.0119** 0.0118** 0.0113** 0.0113** 0.0114** 0.0116** 
 (0.0050) (0.0050) (0.0050) (0.0050) (0.0051) (0.0050) 
PolRiskRating -0.0068 -0.0069 -0.0068 -0.0064 -0.0061 -0.0062 
 (0.0061) (0.0061) (0.0061) (0.0061) (0.0062) (0.0062) 
Consolidation -0.1318*      
 (0.0692)      
Dur_Consol  -0.0801**     
  (0.0383)     
Spend_Consol   -0.2359    
   (0.1443)    
Dur_Spend_Consol    -0.1104   
    (0.0792)   
Tax_Consol     -0.0073  
     (0.1099)  
Dur_Tax_Consol      -0.0264 
      (0.0534) 
Constant -3.7726 -3.7255 -3.7041 -3.5547 -3.5309 -3.5701 
 (2.6413) (2.6383) (2.5907) (2.5998) (2.6642) (2.6531) 
Observations 1,806 1,806 1,806 1,806 1,806 1,806 
R-squared 0.2313 0.2318 0.2329 0.2311 0.2293 0.2295 
Number of countries 72 72 72 72 72 72 
 Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 7. Evidence for OECD countries. 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
HDI_gr(-1) 0.6696*** 0.6602*** 0.4994*** 0.4879*** 0.4484*** 0.4477*** 
 (0.0509) (0.0552) (0.0704) (0.0703) (0.0737) (0.0736) 
GovStab  -0.0016 0.0006 0.0003 0.0127 0.0127 
  (0.0040) (0.0063) (0.0062) (0.0097) (0.0096) 
Polity2  -0.0003 -0.0070 -0.0030 -0.0146 -0.0143 
  (0.0063) (0.0100) (0.0093) (0.0097) (0.0097) 
GovCons_pc   -0.1485* -0.1079 -0.0490 -0.0478 
   (0.0796) (0.0833) (0.0799) (0.0809) 
GovInv_pc   -0.0265 -0.0345 -0.0164 -0.0175 
   (0.0429) (0.0419) (0.0417) (0.0419) 
PrivInv_pc   0.1678** 0.1587** 0.0727 0.0721 
   (0.0682) (0.0703) (0.0610) (0.0615) 
Openness   -0.2404** -0.1907* -0.2215* -0.2206* 
   (0.1019) (0.1000) (0.1133) (0.1132) 
Inflation   -0.0353 -0.0624 0.0199 0.0191 
   (0.0675) (0.0639) (0.0445) (0.0443) 
UrbanPop    -0.4150*** -0.3273* -0.3283* 
    (0.1317) (0.1666) (0.1666) 
ReligiousTensions    0.0061 0.0103 0.0109 
    (0.0167) (0.0198) (0.0197) 
EcoRiskRating     0.0226*** 0.0226*** 
     (0.0057) (0.0057) 
FinRiskRating     0.0052 0.0052 
     (0.0034) (0.0034) 
PolRiskRating     -0.0077* -0.0077* 
     (0.0042) (0.0042) 
Consolidation -0.0315* -0.0389* 0.0107 0.0054 0.0115 - 
 (0.0178) (0.0209) (0.0254) (0.0246) (0.0197) - 
Dur_Consol  - - - - 0.0005 
  - - - - (0.0158) 
Constant 0.1813*** 0.2020*** 1.2016* 8.0870*** 6.2240** 6.2330** 
 (0.0298) (0.0682) (0.6551) (2.3875) (3.0154) (3.0140) 
Observations 1,016 908 655 655 654 654 
R-squared 0.4218 0.4086 0.3327 0.3397 0.3721 0.3720 
Number of countries 33 32 26 26 26 26 
 Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 8. Evidence for non-OECD countries. 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
HDI_gr(-1) 0.7173*** 0.6120*** 0.5462*** 0.5395*** 0.5036*** 0.5002*** 
 (0.0365) (0.0502) (0.0563) (0.0587) (0.0574) (0.0571) 
GovStab  0.0317*** 0.0291** 0.0327*** 0.0281** 0.0285** 
  (0.0106) (0.0124) (0.0112) (0.0110) (0.0110) 
Polity2  0.0047 0.0145* 0.0170* 0.0143 0.0143 
  (0.0059) (0.0086) (0.0091) (0.0097) (0.0097) 
GovCons_pc   -0.1336** -0.1325** -0.1184* -0.1211* 
   (0.0648) (0.0604) (0.0668) (0.0660) 
GovInv_pc   0.1170** 0.1219** 0.0733 0.0753 
   (0.0564) (0.0511) (0.0453) (0.0458) 
PrivInv_pc   0.0188 0.0177 0.0402 0.0406 
   (0.0691) (0.0708) (0.0662) (0.0657) 
Openness   0.0478 0.0454 0.0290 0.0251 
   (0.0619) (0.0704) (0.0742) (0.0731) 
Inflation   -0.0014 -0.0020 -0.0010 -0.0010 
   (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0014) (0.0014) 
UrbanPop    -0.0777 -0.0882 -0.0947 
    (0.1126) (0.1214) (0.1232) 
ReligiousTensions    -0.0731** -0.0704* -0.0710* 
    (0.0305) (0.0373) (0.0374) 
EcoRiskRating     0.0170*** 0.0175*** 
     (0.0056) (0.0056) 
FinRiskRating     -0.0030 -0.0030 
     (0.0044) (0.0044) 
PolRiskRating     -0.0010 -0.0010 
     (0.0037) (0.0037) 
Consolidation -0.0951* -0.1943*** -0.2147*** -0.2083*** -0.1830*** - 
 (0.0568) (0.0513) (0.0553) (0.0579) (0.0486) - 
Dur_Consol  - - - - -0.0978*** 
  - - - - (0.0194) 
Constant 0.2675*** 0.1404*** 0.1655 1.7927 1.4982 1.6037 
 (0.0353) (0.0503) (0.3578) (1.7057) (1.8926) (1.9160) 
Observations 1,631 1,290 1,075 1,075 1,072 1,072 
R-squared 0.5460 0.4329 0.3972 0.4039 0.3813 0.3816 
Number of countries 58 49 46 46 46 46 
 Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 9. Alternative sampling and regional analysis. 
Variables (ADV) (EME) (LIC) (AFR) (EUR) (AP) (MECA) (WH) 
Consolidation 0.0023 -0.1994*** -0.1768** -0.3205** -0.0633* 0.1086* -0.2751* 0.0026 
 (0.0249) (0.0573) (0.0768) (0.1123) (0.0361) (0.0590) (0.1119) (0.0650) 
         
Dur_Consol -0.0210 -0.1004*** -0.0893*** -0.2193** -0.0380 0.0310 -0.1046** -0.0090 
 (0.0195) (0.0249) (0.0284) (0.0765) (0.0263) (0.0407) (0.0376) (0.0258) 
         
Spend_Consol -0.0199 -0.2702** -0.3278** -0.5270** -0.0733 0.0423 -0.4577 -0.0563 
 (0.0374) (0.1099) (0.1505) (0.1963) (0.0546) (0.1293) (0.2959) (0.0581) 
         
Dur_Spend_Consol -0.0213 -0.1307** -0.1731* -0.2464 -0.0225 -0.0066 -0.4372 -0.0477 
 (0.0225) (0.0488) (0.0899) (0.1644) (0.0389) (0.0869) (0.2248) (0.0449) 
         
Tax_Consol 0.0474 -0.1497* -0.0225 -0.0563 -0.0341 0.1764 -0.2018 0.0343 
 (0.0725) (0.0842) (0.0851) (0.0782) (0.0482) (0.1969) (0.1273) (0.0882) 
         
Dur_Tax_Consol -0.0116 -0.0772** -0.0402 -0.0241 -0.0357 0.0377 -0.0865** 0.0012 
 (0.0266) (0.0309) (0.0333) (0.1021) (0.0398) (0.0740) (0.0279) (0.0291) 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Country groups: advanced economies (ADV), 
emerging markets (EME) and low-income countries (LIC); Geographical regions: Asia-Pacific (AP), Europe (EUR), Middle East 
and Central Asia (MECA), Sub-Saharan Africa (AFR) and Western Hemisphere (WH). 
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Table 10. Robustness to the use of alternative estimators: Outlier-robust and IV-GLS. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Variables Outlier -robust IV-GLS 
HDI_gr(-1) 0.4553*** 0.4534*** 0.4504*** 0.4422*** 0.4562*** 0.2251*** 0.5190*** 0.5174*** 0.5160*** 0.5363*** 0.5192*** 0.5405*** 
 (0.0588) (0.0589) (0.0600) (0.0533) (0.0590) (0.0706) (0.0556) (0.0555) (0.0553) (0.0559) (0.0560) (0.0566) 
GovStab 0.0263*** 0.0264*** 0.0261*** 0.029*** 0.0259*** 0.0442*** 0.0271*** 0.0272*** 0.0271*** 0.0228*** 0.0269*** 0.0231*** 
 (0.0079) (0.0079) (0.0079) (0.0080) (0.0078) (0.0105) (0.0068) (0.0068) (0.0068) (0.0069) (0.0068) (0.0069) 
Polity2 0.0096 0.0094 0.0098 0.0105 0.0092 0.0088 0.0128** 0.0127** 0.0136** 0.0105* 0.0125** 0.0095 
 (0.0079) (0.0080) (0.0081) (0.0075) (0.0079) (0.0098) (0.0059) (0.0059) (0.0060) (0.0058) (0.0059) (0.0058) 
GovCons_pc -0.1596*** -0.1599*** -0.1604*** -0.0398 -0.1580*** -0.1477 -0.1436*** -0.1453*** -0.1445*** -0.0866 -0.1436*** -0.1707 
 (0.0560) (0.0568) (0.0560) (0.1310) (0.0557) (0.1424) (0.0541) (0.0540) (0.0544) (0.2088) (0.0544) (0.2100) 
GovInv_pc 0.1284** 0.1274** 0.1257** -0.0511 0.1298** -0.0081 0.1185** 0.1172** 0.1168** -0.0311 0.1198** -0.0012 
 (0.0554) (0.0555) (0.0539) (0.0600) (0.0557) (0.0691) (0.0546) (0.0544) (0.0543) (0.1112) (0.0551) (0.1100) 
PrivInv_pc 0.0194 0.0205 0.0232 -0.0157* 0.0166 -0.0171 0.0191 0.0218 0.0221 -0.0089 0.0181 -0.0087 
 (0.0426) (0.0431) (0.0421) (0.0072) (0.0424) (0.0131) (0.0444) (0.0442) (0.0441) (0.0080) (0.0444) (0.0075) 
Openness -0.0585 -0.0576 -0.0548 -0.0533 -0.0662 -0.1121*** -0.0289 -0.0275 -0.0271 -0.0156 -0.0369 -0.0282 
 (0.0461) (0.0459) (0.0469) (0.0433) (0.0440) (0.0403) (0.0578) (0.0576) (0.0582) (0.0659) (0.0560) (0.0633) 
Inflation -0.0011 -0.0011 -0.0011 0.0001 -0.0010 -0.0003 -0.0007 -0.0008 -0.0007 -0.0000 -0.0006 0.0001 
 (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0016) (0.0014) (0.0021) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0017) (0.0015) (0.0017) (0.0015) 
UrbanPop -0.2208*** -0.2229*** -0.2240*** -0.3304*** -0.2260*** -0.3607*** -0.2077*** -0.2095*** -0.2089*** -0.1909** -0.2133*** -0.1912** 
 (0.0823) (0.0833) (0.0834) (0.0737) (0.0823) (0.1241) (0.0802) (0.0803) (0.0805) (0.0908) (0.0802) (0.0908) 
ReligiousTensions -0.0633** -0.0639** -0.0644** -0.0359 -0.0655** -0.0435* -0.0513*** -0.0513*** -0.0514*** -0.0516** -0.0533*** -0.0522** 
 (0.0296) (0.0298) (0.0296) (0.0218) (0.0295) (0.0238) (0.0196) (0.0196) (0.0194) (0.0202) (0.0196) (0.0203) 
EcoRiskRating 0.0201*** 0.0203*** 0.0195*** 0.0163*** 0.0205*** 0.0185*** 0.0166*** 0.0168*** 0.0160*** 0.0175*** 0.0169*** 0.0188*** 
 (0.0049) (0.0049) (0.0050) (0.0048) (0.0049) (0.0048) (0.0044) (0.0043) (0.0044) (0.0044) (0.0044) (0.0044) 
FinRiskRating 0.0017 0.0017 0.0016 0.0057** 0.0016 0.0048 0.0020 0.0020 0.0017 0.0041 0.0019 0.0044 
 (0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0024) (0.0032) (0.0033) (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0030) (0.0029) (0.0031) 
PolRiskRating -0.0017 -0.0018 -0.0016 -0.0032 -0.0014 -0.0041 -0.0027 -0.0028 -0.0027 -0.0046* -0.0024 -0.0045* 
 (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0028) (0.0030) (0.0042) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0024) (0.0023) (0.0024) 
Consolidation -0.0835**      -0.0801*      
 (0.0316)      (0.0427)      
Dur_Consol  -0.0510***      -0.0538**     
  (0.0147)      (0.0225)     
Spend_Consol   -0.1239**      -0.1413***    
   (0.0540)       -0.0613***   
Dur_Spend_Consol    -0.0511**      (0.0226)   
    (0.0228)         
Tax_Consol     -0.0322      -0.0066  
     (0.0554)      (0.0668)  
Dur_Tax_Consol      0.0103      -0.0199 
      (0.0245)      (0.0220) 
Constant 3.6701*** 3.7019*** 3.7356*** 5.1600*** 3.7692*** 5.7163***       
 (1.3491) (1.3612) (1.3593) (1.1729) (1.3462) (2.0553)       
Observations 1,711 1,710 1,710 1586 1,711 907 1,769 1,769 1,769 1731 1,769 1731 
R-squared 0.3828 0.3825 0.3795 0.3576 0.3806 0.2149 0.3856 0.3865 0.3868 0.3795 0.3839 0.3774 
Number of countries 72 72 72 71 72 70 72 72 72 72 72 72 
  Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 11. Robustness to the use of alternative estimators: Difference-GMM and system-GMM. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Variables Difference-GMM System-GMM 
   
HDI_gr(-1) 0.4256*** 0.4248*** 0.4199*** 0.4142*** 0.4154*** 0.4173*** 0.5941*** 0.5933*** 0.5929*** 0.5915*** 0.5872*** 0.5881*** 
 (0.0881) (0.0874) (0.0904) (0.091) (0.0902) (0.091) (0.0684) (0.0677) (0.0692) (0.069) (0.0697) (0.069) 
GovStab 0.0506* 0.0498* 0.0485* 0.0463* 0.0498* 0.0510* 0.0533*** 0.0531*** 0.0548*** 0.0531*** 0.0513*** 0.0515*** 
 (0.0263) (0.0262) (0.0261) (0.026) (0.0259) (0.026) (0.0172) (0.0174) (0.0173) (0.018) (0.0177) (0.018) 
Polity2 0.0516* 0.0515 0.0561* 0.0591* 0.0570* 0.0564* 0.0397* 0.0398* 0.0392* 0.0399* 0.0428** 0.0429** 
 (0.0308) (0.0310) (0.0307) (0.031) (0.0289) (0.029) (0.0201) (0.0202) (0.0206) (0.021) (0.0201) (0.020) 
GovCons_pc -0.2739 -0.2754 -0.2340 -0.2193 -0.3255* -0.3148* -0.2581* -0.2641** -0.2235* -0.2340* -0.2982** -0.2921** 
 (0.1844) (0.1814) (0.1797) (0.183) (0.1820) (0.180) (0.1357) (0.1305) (0.1286) (0.128) (0.1331) (0.129) 
GovInv_pc 0.4186** 0.4124** 0.3676** 0.3494* 0.4507** 0.4497** 0.3794*** 0.3799*** 0.3557*** 0.3565*** 0.4003*** 0.3996*** 
 (0.1863) (0.1835) (0.1822) (0.181) (0.1819) (0.181) (0.1163) (0.1134) (0.1127) (0.111) (0.1164) (0.114) 
PrivInv_pc -0.0965 -0.0887 -0.0996 -0.0966 -0.0832 -0.0900 -0.1469** -0.1422** -0.1525** -0.1441** -0.1274* -0.1316* 
 (0.0694) (0.0699) (0.0690) (0.067) (0.0736) (0.073) (0.0676) (0.0676) (0.0631) (0.064) (0.0669) (0.067) 
Openness 0.0228 0.0276 0.0251 0.0327 0.0002 0.0042 -0.2063** -0.2037** -0.2233** -0.2107** -0.2180** -0.2185** 
 (0.1652) (0.1692) (0.1569) (0.170) (0.1510) (0.152) (0.0893) (0.0892) (0.0906) (0.089) (0.0897) (0.090) 
Inflation -0.0183 -0.0185 -0.0197 -0.0206 -0.0175 -0.0172 -0.0313 -0.0314 -0.0320 -0.0328 -0.0294 -0.0296 
 (0.0170) (0.0169) (0.0175) (0.018) (0.0165) (0.016) (0.0197) (0.0198) (0.0204) (0.021) (0.0186) (0.019) 
UrbanPop -1.3781*** -1.3857*** -1.2842*** -1.3114*** -1.3405*** -1.3522*** -0.2086** -0.2110** -0.2060** -0.2130** -0.2095** -0.2077** 
 (0.4496) (0.4548) (0.4424) (0.454) (0.4482) (0.449) (0.0900) (0.0904) (0.0876) (0.090) (0.0958) (0.094) 
ReligiousTensions -0.2041* -0.2041* -0.1809 -0.1869 -0.2077* -0.1985* -0.0787 -0.0794 -0.0640 -0.0693 -0.0881 -0.0832 
 (0.1136) (0.1130) (0.1211) (0.117) (0.1082) (0.109) (0.0795) (0.0804) (0.0782) (0.080) (0.0811) (0.080) 
EcoRiskRating 0.0316*** 0.0321*** 0.0291*** 0.0297*** 0.0313*** 0.0315*** 0.0156** 0.0160** 0.0145* 0.0150* 0.0165** 0.0164** 
 (0.0088) (0.0088) (0.0087) (0.009) (0.0081) (0.008) (0.0076) (0.0075) (0.0076) (0.008) (0.0072) (0.007) 
FinRiskRating 0.0091 0.0092 0.0070 0.0079 0.0064 0.0068 -0.0009 -0.0009 -0.0013 -0.0013 -0.0034 -0.0034 
 (0.0090) (0.0090) (0.0089) (0.009) (0.0096) (0.009) (0.0084) (0.0084) (0.0084) (0.009) (0.0089) (0.009) 
PolRiskRating 0.0028 0.0027 0.0026 0.0024 0.0044 0.0031 -0.0070 -0.0071 -0.0086 -0.0086 -0.0059 -0.0065 
 (0.0128) (0.0129) (0.0128) (0.013) (0.0126) (0.013) (0.0076) (0.0077) (0.0076) (0.008) (0.0081) (0.008) 
Consolidation -0.0750      -0.0704      
 (0.0921)      (0.0935)      
Dur_Consol  -0.0545      -0.0426     
  (0.0535)      (0.0460)     
Spend_Consol   -0.4379***      -0.3571***    
   (0.1176)          
Dur_Spend_Consol    -0.2258***      -0.1544**   
    (0.066)      (0.068)   
Tax_Consol     0.2769***      0.2491**  
     (0.0892)      (0.0960)  
Dur_Tax_Consol      0.0954**      0.0914** 
      (0.042)      (0.040) 
Constant       4.4712** 4.4868** 4.6320**  4.5759**  
       (1.8393) (1.8495) (1.8418)  (1.9101)  
Observations 1,699 1,699 1,699 1,699 1,699 1,699 1,775 1,775 1,775 1,775 1,775 1,775 
Number of countries 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 
  Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Appendix 
 
Table A: List of countries included in the analysis. 
1 Argentina 
 
16 Cote d'Ivoire 
 
31 Italy 
 
46 Netherlands 
 
61 South Africa 
  2 Australia 
 
17 Czech Republic 
 
32 Japan 
 
47 New Zealand 
 
62 Sudan 
  3 Austria 
 
18 Egypt 
 
33 Jordan 
 
48 Nicaragua 
 
63 Switzerland 
  4 Bangladesh 
 
19 Estonia 
 
34 Kazakhstan 
 
49 Nigeria 
 
64 Tanzania 
  5 Belgium 
 
20 Ethiopia 
 
35 Kenya 
 
50 Norway 
 
65 Thailand 
  6 Bolivia 
 
21 Finland 
 
36 Korea 
 
51 Pakistan 
 
66 Turkey 
  7 Brazil 
 
22 France 
 
37 Lithuania 
 
52 Peru 
 
67 Uganda 
  8 Bulgaria 
 
23 Germany 
 
38 Madagascar 
 
53 Philippines 
 
68 Ukraine 
  9 Burkina Faso 
 
24 Ghana 
 
39 Malaysia 
 
54 Poland 
 
69 United Kingdom 
  10 Cameroon 
 
25 Greece 
 
40 Mali 
 
55 Portugal 
 
70 United States 
  11 Canada 
 
26 Haiti 
 
41 Mexico 
 
56 Romania 
 
71 Yemen  
  12 Chile 
 
27 Honduras 
 
42 Moldova 
 
57 Russia 
 
72 Zambia 
 13 China 
 
28 India 
 
43 Morocco 
 
58 Saudi Arabia 
    14 Colombia 
 
29 Indonesia 
 
44 Mozambique 
 
59 Singapore 
     15 Congo, Republic of 
 
30 Israel 
 
45 Myanmar 
 
60 Slovak Republic 
     
 
 
